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PRIVACY RIGHTS, SCHOOL CHOICE,
AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT

Lawrence Lee Oldaker·
I. INTRODUCTION

From its seventeenth-century Puritan New England
inception, the nation's system of public schools has been called
upon to provide an ever-expanding array of academic and
non-instructional services. This near-monopolistic
governmental activity has drawn continuous social commentary
from its beginning to the present day. On one side, a stable,
majority following has supported public school programs
through the years. Others have challenged basic public
education purpose, process, and achievement. Educational
reform activities are occurring with increasing intensity at
federal, state, and local levels.
School improvement plans in the 1970s and 80s called for
higher educational outcomes without general agreement on
specific proposals to correct low performance. The 1983 "A
Nation at Risk" study created anxious stirrings within the
educational community and exposed discernible gaps between
the rhetoric and the realities of meaningful change in school
programming. 1
Later, a second generation of critics moved to improve
conditions in the national education colossus by decentralizing
policy making and control, especially in the larger school units.
In the wings, a third wave of reformers decried the futility of
top-down managerial adjustment and championed parental
choice among schools. 2
This latest ground swell to improve American education
centers on the adoption of consumer values in choosing schools.
To many, the notion of competition for pupil enrollment would

* Dr. Oldaker is an associate professor of education and Head of the
Graduate Programs in Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at the University
of Alaska Southeast in Juneau, Alaska.
1.
For an illustrated scenario of why reforms fail, see MYRON LIEBERMAN,
PRIVATIZATION & EDUCATIONAL CHOICE 14-21 (1989). A thoughtful analysis of the
pervasive complexities in reforming school administration training programs
appears in Daniel L. Duke, The Rhetoric and the Reality of Reform in Educational
Administration, Phi Delta Kappan, June 1992, at 764-770.
G. ALFRED HESS, JR., Basis for Restructuring Schools. in ScHOOL
2.
RESTRUCTURING, CHICAGO STYLE (1991).
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reward exemplary programs, highlight promising community
innovations, and force alterations in undesirable operations.
School choice advocates include President George Bush and
Education Secretary Lamar Alexander, who introduced the
"America 2000" legislative plan to affed six reform goals for
education set forth in the 1989 Charlottesville, Virginia
conference on education. The federal initiatives, unveiled two
years later would place a "heavy emphasis on 'parental choice,'
a euphemism for vouchers for private and parochial schools."3
As our Congress debates the legislative merits of school
choice in the "America 2000" measure, related questions
surface concerning the rights of parents, the governance of
education, and the constitutional implications of reform
incentives coming from the federal executive branch. Among
serious civic issues to be resolved are the following:
(1) Do parents have a natural right of privacy in selecting
the manner in which they raise children?
(2) Is education one of these rights, thereby giving credence
to parental school selection?
(3) Are the Federal Constitution's Ninth Amendment4
unenumerated rights the appropriate authority for school
choice plans?
(4) If the choice issue becomes a Ninth Amendment issue,
what are the implications for traditional school governance?
(5) Should choice in schooling be viewed as an emerging
Ninth Amendment right, how can public education as a Tenth
Amendment 5 function coexist under two constitutional
amendments?
The purpose of this paper is to address these queries by
exploring the foundations of rights-theory relative to the
constitutional laws that govern our contemporary public school
systems. Responses to these questions should contribute to the
general understanding of the political forces reshaping the
nation's schools.

3.
Nick Pennington, Don't Look to Congress for Systemic Reform Plans, THE
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR, June 1992, at 24.
4.
The Ninth Amendment states "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
5.
The Tenth Amendment states "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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II. THE ENDURING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS
In pre-recorded times, kindred families made significant
social compacts. Individuals willingly surrendered natural
rights to gain protection from harm and to benefit from the
collective labor of a larger group. Important agreements were
reached to confirm the social order's leader, to determine the
relationships of rights and responsibilities among those in the
group, and to organize the community for the common good.
Once adopted, this conduct was perpetuated as memories,
customs, and traditions by leaders and storytellers. Much later,
written languages aided philosophers and scholars in recording
their thoughts and in sharing their ideas with others about the
merits of their society. Through the ages, many philosophers
went beyond merely describing their social orders to
prescribing "utopian" relationships based on their perception of
an ideal society.
Hammurabi, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas,
and other ancient and medieval scholar-philosophers believed
that society was governed by reason and strong, natural
codes. 6 Natural law and governance continued to be a
dominant theme among European thinkers contemplating the
ideal citizen under a central government. St. Thomas Aquinas 7
envisioned natural laws as being eternal, unchangeable,
universal, distinguishable from civil laws, and emanating from
God. This concept became the unifying force that (1) made the
Justinian code 8 cohesive and (2) supported the individual's
corporate union with others in common social institutions,
notably the Church of Rome. This fusion of classical and
Christian thought provided a rational blend of state and
church. 9 For a time, rights-theorists and their probing
questions regarding the source and placement of natural rights
were quieted.
6.
Fourteenth century Moslem historian-philosopher Ibn Khaldoun contributed
to the eventual development of the social sciences with an insistence that human
relationships were governed by natural laws that guided past actions and predicted
future social directions. The credit afforded Khaldoun, as well as the discussions on
natural law, has been deleted from the 1981 edition of this praiseworthy sociology
text. See MELVIN L. DEFLEUR ET AL., SOCIOLOGY: HUMAN SOCIETY 4-5 (197.3).
7.
2 Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas 74889 (Anton C. Pegis, ed., 194fi).
8.
2 S.P. Scott, The Civil Law (1973). Justinian was the Byzantine emperor
who codified the Roman law.
9.
Peter J. Stanlis, The Philosophic Content and Historical Importance of
Natural Law, in EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 3-13 (1986).
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Mter Roman political influence decreased in Europe,
Henry de Bracton, English ecclesiastic and judge, used natural
law concepts in merging civil and common law in England. His
treatment of the subject had no rival until the classic legal
Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone were circulated and
discussed five centuries later. 10 Continuing with the natural
law and natural rights theme in England, the
formalist-philosopher Thomas Hobbes was convinced these laws
and rights were separate entities. He believed that the rights of
nature were attached to individuals, who may exercise them or
rightfully cede them to the sovereign. II Viewed widely as a
materialist, Hobbes favored an absolute monarchy with power
and rights descending from above. Edmund Burke, one of
England's most prolific legal scholars, believed that natural law
was embodied in the customs of the land but were transmitted
through legal precedence and procedures. To Burke, these laws
and rights were products of convention, not attributes of
birthright. 12 However, Jeremy Bentham refmed to consider
the existence of rights beyond the government. Bentham
dismissed natural and imprescriptible rights as "rhetorical
nonsense, nonsense upon stilts."I 3
In contrast to the authoritarian Hobbes, John Locke
favored the more liberal interpretation that natural rights were
developed from natural laws because individuals and societies
have a moral duty to preserve the non-transferable rights of
life, liberty and sovereignty, and preservation.I 4 According to
Locke, reason guided each person out of harm's way and
protected everyone against encroachment from one another.
This rational social contract grew out of the tradition of natural
law and, in part, required each person to give up a degree of
independence for the betterment of all. This is also a strong
theme in Blackstone's writings. These natural, individual
rights and the ability of the collective citizenry to restrict and
support governmental powers, as envisioned by common law,
Locke, and Blackstone, 15 found their way into the English Bill
of Rights ( 1689 ), the American Declaration of Independence
10.
!d. at 10-11.
MICHAEL FREEDEN, RIGHTS 12-14 (1991).
11.
!d. at 16-17.
12.
!d. at 11'!-19.
13.
14.
!d. at 14-16.
15.
For an excellent commentary on European enlightenment, natural rights,
and common law leading to American independence, see ROBERT S. PECK, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS & THE POUTICS OF INTERPRETATION 2:-J-3::l (1992).
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(1776), the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), the U. S.
Constitution (1789), and the federal Bill of Rights (1791). 16
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, held in
Philadelphia to amend the Articles of Confederation, the
assemblage had authorization from the state legislatures to
adopt a new form of government. In drafting the proposed
federal constitution, our colonial fathers omitted the concepts of
natural rights and natural laws, thereby creating the potential
unwanted consequences of ( 1) not obtaining state ratification of
the pact or (2) holding a second convention to reconsider the
individual rights issue. 17 To avoid either of these possibilities,
the politically-entrenched Federalists were forced to support
the addition of a bill of rights, which would take the form of
amendments. In staunch opposition to a "dangerous"
declaration of individual rights, Alexander Hamilton expressed
his opinion that such a pretext of protections for citizens would
be unenforceable and unneeded since "the Constitution is itself
... A BILL OF RIGHTS." 18
In a move to help create a more comprehensive
constitution, convention delegate George Mason, author of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights in the Virginia Constitution of
1776, was unsuccessful in convincing the assembly to accept a
bill of rights before convening. Mason's Virginia Declaration
was the nation's first human rights document, the model for all
subsequent declarations. He had correctly surmised that the
American people wanted individual protection from intrusive
governmental acts. 19 Staunch Federalist James Madison
sensed the mood of his countrymen and, after conferring with
Hamilton and corresponding with rights-supporter Thomas
Jefferson in France, drafted the Bill of Rights for Congressional
consideration and passage. The ten-amendment addition was
accepted by the people and affixed to the Constitution in 1791,
two years after the states had approved the original
document. 20
Following the nation's ratification of the new compact as a
cornerstone of law and order, legal challenges in the federal

16.
ld. at 829-58.
17.
See, Gary Will Introduction, in THE FEDERALI&'T PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON AND JOHN JAY vii-xxvii (Bantam Books 1982).
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
18.
19.
Albert P. Blaustein and Carol Tenny, Understanding ''Rights" and Bills of
Rights, 25 U. Rich. L. Rev. 411-13 (1991).
Peck, supra note 15, at 55-82.
20.
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structure began to surface. Initially, most of the friction was
limited to conflicts over powers exercised by each of the three
branches of government. Shortly thereafter, a profound political
shock wave was felt in the young country when an individual
citizen brought suit against a neighboring state in the third
session of the new U. S. Supreme Court. 21 The constitutional
framers simply had not planned for a person to sue a state in
federal court when they crafted the judicial clauses. 22 As an
afterthought, Congress took immediate action to protect the
states' sovereign powers by hurriedly fashioning and adopting
the Eleventh Amendment which limits the scope of federal
courts in addressing state matters. 23 Thereafter, individual
citizens were directed to the state courts for relief in matters
lacking a federal question. Challenges to governmental action
did not become commonplace until after the Civil War when
plaintiffs were aided by the passage of three Reconstruction
Amendments, 24 the enactment of civil rights statutes/ 5 and
the adoption of new congressional powers limiting the reach of
state action. 26
The number of persons seeking federal court protection
from governmental acts has increased dramatically in this
century. This increase was aided by the Supreme Court's
development of the "incorporation" doctrine, which applied the
Bill of Rights to the states. The Court's application of
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment was the

21.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
22.
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain . . . ." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. "The judicial power shall extend to all
cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made ... ; to controversies to which the United States shall
be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and
citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of
tbe same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a
State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects." U.S. CONST.
art III, § 2, cl. 1.
23.
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State."
U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. For a history of the amendment and its application in
educational matters, see Lawrence Lee Oldaker and David L. Dagley, The Eleventh
Amendment, Its History and Current Application to Schools and Universities, 72
EDUC. LAW REP. 479, 479-487 (1992).
24.
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV.
25.
See 42 U.S.C, §§ 1971-1981 for the five Civil Rights Acts signed into law
between 1866 and 1875.
26.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
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basis for constitutional analysis in cases involving state
statutes which restricted free speech,~ 7 religious expression, 28
religious establishment, 29 racially segregated schools, 30
family privacy and birth control,31 and abortion.a 2 This
movement has caused spirited debates between libertarians
who support jurists looking to sources outside of the
Constitution to enforce unwritten natural rights and others
who seek evidence of the framers' original intent in perceiving
judicial limits. The more liberal activists press central
government agencies for help in protecting perceived natural
law rights to life, liberty, property, and especially since the
1960s, the modern law dimension of privacy. Conservative
"Originalists" favor limiting judges by citing the plan of the
convention and the precise wording of the Constitution and
written statutes. 33
While the concept of natural rights permeates American
society, the critical issue is how courts identify and authorize
unenumerated human rights. In the United States today a
conservative Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist is a highly visible focal point of this
debate. The Rehnquist Court demonstrates the propensity for
applying conservative interpretations to the law and reversing
the holdings of the more-activist Warren and Burger Courts.
This shift in judicial philosophy was evident in the clash of
Libertarian-Originalist's values which surfaced during the
late-1987 Senate Judicial Committee hearings on the
nomination of Robert Bork to the high court. At issue was the
candidate's perception of the judicial role when addressing the
grievances of individuals against perceived governmental
wrongs, thus giving rise to the question of unenumerated
natural rights. Judge Bork's nomination was rejected, in part,
because of his reservations about incorporating standards of

27.
Gitlow v. New York, 26R U.S. 6fi2 (192fi); see Todd Brewster, First &
Foremost, LIFE, Fall 1991, at 61; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 642 (19RR).
28.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
29.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.483 (19fi4).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (196fi).
31.
32.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33.
For superior commentaries on these contrasting concepts, see Suzanna
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, fi4 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987) and
Helen K Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionali:;m:
Did The Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of '"Unwritten'' Individual
Riphts?, 69 N.C.L. REV. 421 (1991).
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equal protection not enumerated in constitutional and statutory
laws. Bork has said, "[t]he clash over my nomination was
simply one battle in this long-running war for control of our
legal culture."34 Later, in 1991, Circuit Court Jurist Clarence
Thomas was approved for membership on the Court as
successor to retiring justice Thurgood Marshall. Thomas
survived the committee's stern questioning about his views on
personal liberties (especially the natural right to privacy and
women's right to obtain an abortion) as expressed in his law
school discussions and in his earlier writings.
In spite of the present Court's pronounced movement to the
"right," its direction remains uncertain because future
presidential elections carry the fresh executive's duty to
nominate members to federal benches. Every court has had
members near career's end. Since Justices Byron White, Harry
Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens are all over seventy, the
next President is likely to replace one or more of the jurists
and to redefine the Court's balance once more. 35

III.

CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENT TOWARD EDUCATIONAL CHOICE

In our nation's educational systems, there exists an
enormous enterprise actively involving more than half of the
nation's population, including such broad categories as
students, parents, employees, and governors of school policies.
To add to the complexities of this diverse involvement, aside
from that of interested taxpayers and private fund supporters,
each level of public or private, scholastic or collegiate
organization has its own distinctive client-interest groups.
Unifying all of these interests in promoting change in
education, for whatever purpose, has defied the efforts of
reformers for decades.
Researchers John Chubb and Terry Moe found the
institutions of educational governance at fault for not solving
educational problems because "they are also fundamental
causes of the very problems they are supposed to be solving."36
After reviewing how students learn in school, Chubb and Moe
ranked three factors that influence achievement in the
classroom: (1) student ability, (2) school organization, and (3)

34.
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPI'ING OF AMERICA 2 (1990).
The Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, July 13, 1992, at 23-24.
35.
John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, The Root of the Problem, in POUTICS
36.
MARKETS & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 1R (The Brookings Institution ed., 1990).
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family background. 37 The selection of the second factor (school
organization) as the major focus in proposing educational
reform heightened national interest in how society delivers
services to children. Specifically, the attention directed at the
quality of school structure suggested that allowing them to
compete for demand would nourish the best, foster innovation,
and inspire the whole-a notion Nobel laureate economist
Milton Friedman advanced nearly forty years ago. Friedman
thought schools were better in the past when parents had more
influence in classroom matters. He maintained that his
"voucher plan" would have broken the monopolistic role of
government in financing and managing the growing public
school network. The economist favored giving all families the
same control over their children's schooling that affluent
families enjoy by providing them with a choice of school
programs and a voucher to defray the cost of educational
services. 38 These concepts appear to be reflected in a recent
Gallup/Phi Delta Kappa poll indicating that Americans
overwhelmingly support school choice, national testing, and
radical reform measures as means of attaining higher
scholastic standards. 39
Commentators are skeptical of these reform measures.
Specifically, Michael Fullan and Matthew Miles claim that few
educational policy makers really know what the change process
means. 40 Little change has occurred since the mid-80s with
the exception of advancing the privatization concept. To spur
the nation to combat ignorance, discomfort, and other
educational maladies, Chester Finn proposed reform to get us
out of the "dumbth," a word he coined to define a new and
unprecedented form of mental incapacitation which threatens
to swamp our efforts to restore a competitive, spirited, and
rational society. 41 Finn's urgency suggests the need for
forceful measures and reminds that all revolutions are
disruptive, though not all revolutions are necessarily violent. 42
This call for revolutionary action to improve schools was
furthered by President Bush when he stated: "To those who

37.
3R.
::!9.
40.

!d. at 140.

ROSE AND MILTON FRIEDMAN,FREE To CHOOSE 1fifi-188 (1990).
Dennis P. Doyle, America 2000, PHI DELTA KA.PPAN, Nov. 1991, at 186.
Michael G. Fullan and Matthew B. Miles, Gettinp Rre{orm Ripht: What
Works and What Doesn't, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, June 1992, at 74fi.
CHES'TER E. FINN, JR., WE MUST TAKE CHARGE 12 (1991).
41.
42.
Id. at 239.
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want to see real improvement in American education, I say:
There will be no renaissance without revolution. We who would
be revolutionaries must accept responsibilities for our schools.
It's time we held our schools-and ourselves-accountable for
results. "43
After setting the nation's sights on the six ambitious
national education goals, President Bush addressed the
centerpiece of "America 2000" by hinting that parents have
natural rights and these rights include school choice. President
Bush stated
We can encourage educational excellence by encouraging parental
choice. The concept of choice draws its fundamental strength from the
principle at the very heart of the democratic idea. Every adult
American has the right to vote, the right to decide where to work,
where to live. It's time parents were free to choose the school that their
children attend. 44

At face value, this last statement seems to claim a "natural"
right to privacy for parents to select the manner in which they
raise children and prepare them for the world of work, an
ideological return to an English common law theme. Should this
claim become a serious consideration; is educational choice one
of these natural rights? The President's legislative proposals to
the Congress did not expand this line of reasoning. As school
choice measures are being considered in Congress and in state
legislatures, it is uncertain if the nation's parents and guardians
have embraced the unenumerated right that has been suggested
is theirs. Regardless of the political issue of rights, some
commentators45 contend that individual choice may have
positive consequences.
U. S. House of Representatives Bill No. 4324, the
Neighborhood School Improvement Act, is similar to Senate Bill
No. 2. Both of these Bush Administration proposals, in part,
requested funds to establish America 2000's "535 lighthouse
schools" and to provide incentive money to demonstrate the
effectiveness of educational choice programs involving private
schools. Congress favored much broader reforms than those of
merely assisting one school system in each congressional district.
Senate and House action on the measures specifically deleted

43.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUC., AMERICA 2000, AN AMERICAN STRATEnY
SOURCEBOOK 3-4 (1990) (President Bush's Remarks).
44.
ld. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
45.
Mark G. Yudof, et al., Educational Policy and the Law 427 (1992).
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monetary requests for choice programs that included private
schools. It is clear that there is a willingness to debate the issue
of choice, and it will continue to be hotly contested within the
Washington Beltway as well as in each state. 46
Education Secretary Alexander, who supports America 2000
proposals with bedrock conviction, has professed that private
school choice, admittedly a controversial issue, will soon become
an accepted fact of national life. In noting Alexander's resolve,
however, researcher George Kaplan conducted a prolonged and
fruitless search to find a trace of Alexander's past allegiances to
choice, either as governor or university presidentY
Paul Jung, president of the American Association of School
Administrators, criticized the narrow political agenda of vouchers
and testing as a prelude to a national curriculum, a potential
that will surely arouse contemporary antifederalists embracing
the Constitution's Tenth Amendment reserve powers clause.
Equally skeptical of the administration's proposal, veteran urban
educator Judith Harper suggested that voucher plans would
perpetuate existing inequalities and be especially hurtful to
inner-city children and minorities that would have few true
schooling alternatives from which to choose. Harper singled out
the ones operating in Milwaukee, 48 the first educational choice
plan to involve non-public schools and to be challenged in court.
Milwaukee parents challenged Herbert J. Grover, 49
Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Wisconsin,
because he was perceived to be frustrating the legislative will to
implement the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP),
which would permit children from low-income families to attend
nonsectarian private schools. According to the Wisconsin statute,
the MPCP would create public funding for kindergarten through
twelfth grade children from low-income families residing within
the Milwaukee city limits to attend any nonsectarian private
school in the city at no charge to the student. Each child was to
receive a tuition grant limited to $2,500 while attending an
approved private school, if the enrolling institution demonstrated
that it met at least one of the following standards: (1) it had at

46.
John F. Jennings, Major Education Bills in Congress, PDK LEniSLATIVE
NEWSLETTER, Juen 1992,at 3-4.
47.
George Kaplan, Lamar Alexander and the Politics of School Reform, PHI
DELTA KAPPAN, June 1992, at 71i4.
4H.
Judith A. Harper, Where in the World Is Lamar Ale:xander?, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, June 1992, at 762-3.
49.
Davis v. Grover, 4HO N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).
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least 70% of the pupils in the program advancing one grade each
year, (2) it had an attendance of 90% or more for the
participating program students, (3) it had at least 80% of the
program pupils demonstrating significant academic progress, or
(4) it had at least 70% of the families of pupils in the program
meet parent involvement criteria established by the private
school. Further stipulations regulating participation in the
MPCP addressed family income level, residency, public school
membership prior to participation, health and safety code
compliance, and nonsectarian private school assurances of
nondiscrimination. 50 The program was acknowledged to be
experimental, limiting membership to 1,000 pupils at a cost of
$2.5 million to the State of Wisconsin. Each private school could
enroll no more than 49% of its students from the MPCP. 51
The Wisconsin Supreme Court realized the importance of the
MPCP to the state and its significance to the nation as well. In
crafting judicial approval of the choice plan, the court displayed
a degree of pride in Wisconsin's "innovation and willingness to
lead the nation in its attempts to further improve the quality of
education and life."52 The decision turned aside charges ( 1) that
the MPCP violated state constitutional private/local legislation
clauses by embracing more than one subject; 53 (2) that the
MPCP's participating nonsectarian private schools violated the
state's school uniformity clause that ensures comparable equity
among the public schools,54 and (3) that the experimental
program lacked a public purpose. 55 In concluding that the
Milwaukee choice program passes constitutional scrutiny in all
issues, the opening and closing sentences of Justice Ceci's
concurring opinion indicates the tenor of the court's decision. He
said, "Let's give choice a chance!"56

IV. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS

Despite sustained criticism that the reform effort is not a
single panacea to public school ills, 57 the Milwaukee educational
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 46:l.
at 464.
at 462-63, n. 2.
at 465-73.
at 47.3-4.
at 474-7.
at 477-R.
Julie K. Underwood, Choice is Not a Panacea, 71 ED. LAW REP. 599 (1992).

,..,.
'

...;
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choice plan has been given a chance. In light of this, several
issues must be addressed. Does education qualify for
fundamental protection under federal constitutional law? Will
the Federal Constitution's Ninth Amendment unenumerated
rights powers grant legitimacy to school choice plans? Should
choice in schooling be viewed as an emerging Ninth Amendment
issue, how will education coexist under other constitutional
amendments? These questions must be examined in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning present day school
operations.
Social fervor surrounding the identification and requested
enforcement of natural school rights appears more intense in
some eras and less important in others. Although there is a
current, pronounced willingness by individuals to press central
governmental agencies for help in seeking protection of these
perceived natural rights, few have advanced the theory that
education is such an unenumerated right. Unspecified rights are
difficult to identify, analyze, and apply to general populations,
especially when human behaviors differ so widely. One precept
maintains that substantive due process or rights protected under
the Ninth Amendment, not expressly found in the literal words
of the constitution, must be widely recognized in our history and
basic values. A federal district court in Kentucky ruled that the
right to a free, public education was not such a fundamental
right rooted in history. The court's reasoning went on to
speculate that a state could even abolish its school systems, if
done in a nondiscriminatory manner. 5 8 In expressing skepticism
about the fundamental nature of education, Barbara Stengel
openly confessed an absence of "love for the natural law/natural
rights theory in general and certainly no sense that there is, in
any way, a right to education apart from particular social and
legal circumstances." However, she proceeded to structure an
analysis of "right to education" as an often-used and an
equally-understood phrase reflecting a manner of speech and a
description of subjective, personal experiences. 5 9
Apart from the comment by President Bush60 supporting
the possibility of school choice being a natural and sheltering
right, in 1984 Chester Nolte advanced a theory that, in the
future, students may have a "right to know" included in the

fiR
59.

Petrey v. Flaugher, 505 F. Supp. 1087 (D.C. Ky. 1981).
Barbara Senkowski Stengel, JUST EDUCATION, THE RmHT TO EDUCATION IN
CONTEXT AND CONVERSATION 4-fi (1991).
60.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUC., supra, note 43.
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unenumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment of the
Constitution. 61 Nolte referred specifically to the Tinker
acknowledgment that students are "persons" under the
Constitution. 62 He further speculated that they may obtain
court protection in receiving instruction and selecting written
materials as a part of their right under Justice Douglas'
penumbra theory, 63 an unexplored aspect of constitutional law
until the Supreme Court broached the topic in 1965.
Virtually ignored in the first two hundred years of U.S.
Constitutional law, the Ninth Amendment was first given effect
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 64 an opinion that overturned a
Connecticut statute as an unconstitutional invasion of marital
privacy. In the opinion of the court, and somewhat aside from the
topic under appeal, the constitutional importance of education
was affirmed. Justice Douglas stated
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in
the Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the
parents' choice--whether public or private or parochial-is also not
mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or
language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include
certain of those rights. By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the right to
educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to the States
by the force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v.
Nebraska, the same dignity is given the right to study the German
language in private school. In other words, the state may not,
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, limit the
spectrum of available knowledge. 65

A concurring opinion in Griswold written by Justice Goldberg
and supported by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan,
completed the first identification of ninth amendment
constitutional rights.
My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted and that
it embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is supported both by
numerous decisions of this Court, referred to in the Court's opinion,
and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment .... I add
these words to emphasize the relevance of that Amendment to the
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62.
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Court's holdin.· .... The Amendment is almost entirely the work of
James Madison. It was introduced in Congress by him and passed the
House and Senate with little or no debate and virtually no change in
language. It was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of
specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover
all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights
would be interpreted as a denial that others were protected. 6G

In continuing the judicial exploration of the Griswold theme,
a 1972 Supreme Court ruling extended the penumbra of the
Ninth Amendment to protect the sexual privacy of unmarried
couples. 67 This ruling caused critics to complain that the high
court improperly expanded the sanctity of the marital bedroom
into a general right to shelter sexual relations for unwedded
couples as well. 68 The most widely discussed privacy rights
ruling occurred one year later as the Court's majority extended
the protection to include the right of women to terminate their
pregnancy by surgical abortion. Fewer rulings in the history of
American jurisprudence have generated as much fervent and
widespread controversy as Roe v. Wade. 69 It confronted deeply
religious and highly personal convictions.
Setting aside the flag-burning confrontations, Roe may be
second only to the Brown school desegregation in social impact
and comparable to the school prayer curbs in Murray. 70
Further, Roe was the high water mark of the privacy rights
decisions and has been embraced by liberal activists but
denounced by the more conservative legal scholars. Its full
"liberty" application has been limited by subsequent rulings, 71
yet it has not been completely overtumed by the Rehnquist
Court in the face of strong criticism by Justice Scalia 72 and
vocal critics not seated on the Court.
Applying fundamental rights to protect privacy rights in the
sex-related cases discussed above did not afford protection for a
Georgian who engaged in homosexual sodomy 73 within the
confines of his bedroom. In the opinion of the court, the reach of
ld. at 486-89.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40fi U.S. 438 (1972).
Peck, supra note 1fi, at 302.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution 114 (1990).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W. 2276 (CA 3 No.
90-1662) (Oct. 21, 1991).
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. fi02 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
72.
concurring).
n. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
66.
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the freedoms established in the Pierce and Meyer educational
cases and the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe trilogy bore no
resemblance to the constitutional claim of homosexuals seeking
protection to engage in acts of sodomy. 74 Three justices in
strong dissent claimed the case was not about "a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy" as the Court declared;
rather, the case was about "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men, namely, 'the right to be
let alone."'75
The recent decisions of the Court indicate a growing majority
of the members sitting on the present Court are beginning to
limit tlie incorporation of ''liberty" interests and privacy rights as
a standard to be applied by federal courts in judging state action,
thus leaving petitioners to seek protection within the liberties
expressed in their state constitutions. The expansive judicial role
attractive to activist judges eager to apply unenumerated rights
to contemporary issues before the courts may be diminishing.
The problematic task of identifying those rights remains. 76
Beyond the decreasing chances of asserting a Ninth
Amendment natural rights claim to education or school choice,
further considerations should be directed to state laws. Since the
Tenth Amendment was also intended to operate in tandem with
the Ninth to protect the unenumerated rights of the states and
their people against federal encroachment, 77 state governments
which operate public systems through their executive branch are
the logical place to seek favor in requesting the desired school
program. Since the U.S. Constitution fails to mention public
education as an explicit duty of the federal government, the
operation of schools has always been relegated to the states. All
states have "incorporated in the education articles of their
constitution that part of republican theory which holds education
essential to self-government ... .'m] States have assumed the
duty to educate in their constitutions and have assumed the

!d. at 190-9.
!d. at 199 (citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Louis Brandeis in Olmstead
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practical financial responsibility for schools as well. 79
It is important to note, in reflecting on Federalist
philosophy, that several states had constitutional documents
guaranteeing citizen rights prior to the Philadelphia
constitutional convention. Perhaps the founders had visions of
states solving their provincial issues when structuring our
system of federalism in the constitution. As the protectionist
shadow of the Supreme Court lessens, state law emerges as an
important legal area to seek protection for individual rights and
responsibilities.
V. CONCLUSION

Natural, self-preserving behavior that protected pre-literate
families was important for survival. With the growth of
organized communities, many of these individualistic forms of
protection were discarded or willingly surrendered to a sovereign
power. Compacts that were created to address social and
economic needs reflected on the roles of those leaders responsible
for the care of others and the rights of individual members
within the community. Although societies vary greatly, most
have retained elements of natural rights for personal protection,
growth, and survival. The issue of natural rights and laws,
considered to be essential in sustaining life, continually surfaces
when individuals feel threatened by the actions of others or by
the governing body. Our federal constitution, as well as the
written compact in each state, specifies certain rights and
responsibilities that regulate behavior within the commonwealth.
From time to time an issue will surface that is not expressly
covered among the list of safeguards that protect individuals.
When this happens, those claiming shelter from intrusive action
may claim a fundamental or natural right as a shield from
perceived harm.
Parents raising their children and providing for their
education become upset when schools, for whatever existing or
imagined reasons, conflict with or fail to satisfy family objectives.
The current tumult surrounding public education demonstrates
widespread dissatisfaction. Increasing numbers of households
with children in school are resentful of the slow progress of
reform measures to attain increased academic achievement and
financial efficiencies. Although private schools have been in
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operation since colonial days, the use of non-public schools as
leverage to force public school improvements has created heated
controversy. Responding to public school critics, a growing
number of governmental officials have proposed a plan for
educational choice that includes fmancial support for any student
to attend a non-public as well as a public school.
Reflecting on an early common law heritage, we are now
forced to consider whether natural or fundamental rights to
liberty and privacy form the basis of a successful constitutional
claim of support for the educational choice plans being
considered in Congress and in state legislatures. A review of
judicial trends that incorporate Bill of Rights protection in state
action and that acknowledge the existence of unenumerated
constitutional rights suggests that federal intervention in state
matters is decreasing. The current judicial posture under federal
laws leads to the conclusion that students do not have a natural
right to education, nor do their parents have a natural right to
school choice. The attractiveness of Ninth Amendment doctrine
does not support either proposition. This element of federalism
relegates questions of public education and the issue of school
choice to the states, both through the expressed design of the
Tenth Amendment and the inclusion of education as an innate
function of the state legislatures. The first school choice plan to
be challenged rightfully appeared in a state court system, where
state constitutional and statutory laws were weighted relative to
the specifics of the choice plan. The precise wording of each state
constitution and its applicable statutes appears to be the
reference point in evaluating the merits of educational choice
programs as a means of bringing about meaningful public school
reform.

